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Rest Breaks and the Duty of the Court to Protect Class Members
California Labor Code section 226.7 prohibits employers from requiring its employees to work during any rest period mandated by the Industrial Welfare Commission (“IWC”) Wage Orders. “[I]n light of the remedial nature of the legislative enactments authorizing the regulation of wages, hours and working conditions for the protection and benefit of employees, the statutory provisions are to be liberally construed with an eye to promoting such protection.” Industrial Welfare Com. v. Superior Court (1980) 27 Cal.3d 690, 702. “[T]he IWC’s wage orders are entitled to ‘extraordinary deference, both in upholding their validity and in enforcing their specific terms.’” Brinker Restaurant Corp. v. Superior Court (2012) 53 Cal.4th 1004, 1027 (quoting Martinez v. Combs (2010) 49 Cal.4th 35, 61). Rest break requirements “have long been viewed as part of the remedial worker protection framework.” Murphy v. Kenneth Cole Productions, Inc. (2007) 40 Cal.4th 1094, 1105.
The Definition of "On-Duty" and "Off-Duty" Periods
Employees must be relieved of all duty during their meal and rest breaks. Brinker, 53 Cal.4th at 1035–1036; Faulkinbury v. Boyd & Associates (2013) 216 Cal.App.4th 220, 236. During breaks, an employee “must be free to attend to any personal business he or she may choose.” Brinker, 53 Cal.4th at 1036. An employee is working and “on duty” when he is “subject to the control of an employer,” “including all the time the employee is suffered or permitted to work, whether or not required to do so.” Wage Order No. 9 § 2(H). Time spent by an employee waiting on standby for the benefit of the employer is considered to be on duty. Madera Police Officers Assn. v. City of Madera (1984) 36 Cal.3d 403.
Certification of a Class Under California Law
The California Supreme Court has identified three requirements for the certification of a class: (1) “the existence of an ascertainable and sufficiently numerous class”; (2) a well-defined community of interest”; and (3) “substantial benefits from certification that render proceeding as a class superior to the alternatives.” Brinker Restaurant Corp. v. Superior Court (Hohnbaum) (2012) 53 Cal.4th 1004, 1021. The community of interest requirement in turn has three factors: (1) common questions of law or fact predominate over individual questions; (2) the class representatives have claims or defenses typical of the class; and (3) the class representatives can adequately represent the class. Id.
Meal and Rest Breaks for "On Call" Health Care Employees
As the California Supreme Court has noted, an employer meets the requirements of the applicable Wage Order’s meal period requirement if the employee (1) has at least 30 minutes uninterrupted, (2) is free to leave the premises, and (3) is relieved of all duty for the entire period. Id. at 1036.However, in the health care industry, as discussed in a Division of Labor Standards Enforcement ("DLSE") Opinion Letter approved by the Brinker Court, an employer may require an employee to remain on its premises, “so long as the worker is relieved of all duties during the meal period.” Dept. Industrial Relations, DLSE Opinion Letter No. 1996.07.12 (July 12, 1996) p. 1 (“1996 Opinion Letter”). In that Opinion Letter, the DLSE discussed whether an employee that is required to carry a pager during a purported meal period must be compensated. The DLSE determined that: "[s]o long as the employee who is simply required to wear the pager is not called upon during the meal period to respond, there is no requirement that the meal period be paid for. On the other hand, if the employee responds, as required to a pager call during the meal period, the whole of the meal period must be compensated."
Privacy Privilege in Discovery
Article I, section 1 of the California Constitution “creates a zone of privacy which protects against unwarranted compelled disclosure of certain private information.” Planned Parenthood Golden Gate v. Superior Court (2000) 83 Cal.App.4th 347, 357. Pioneer Electronics (USA), Inc. v. Superior Court (2007) 40 Cal.4th 360, 370–371. In determining whether information falls within the zone of privacy, the party claiming the privacy privilege must have a reasonable expectation of privacy under the circumstances, including the customs, practices, and physical settings surrounding the circumstances. Hill v. National Collegiate Athletic Association (1994) 7 Cal.4th 1, 35–37.
California Wage and Hour Laws for Large Corporations
“Meal and rest periods have long been viewed as part of the remedial worker protection framework.” Murphy, infra. California law requires employers to authorize and permit rest breaks for every four hours of work or major fraction thereof. The California Supreme Court in Brinker, infra, explained that the “major fraction thereof” requirement means one break for a shift greater than 3.5 but less than 6 (“3.5>6”) hours long, two breaks for a shift greater than 6 but less than 8 (“6>8”) hours long, and three breaks for a shift greater than 10 but less than 12 (“10>12”) hours long.California Labor Code section 226.7 prohibits employers from requiring its employees to work during any rest period mandated by the Industrial Welfare Commission (“IWC”) Wage Orders. “[I]n light of the remedial nature of the legislative enactments authorizing the regulation of wages, hours and working conditions for the protection and benefit of employees, the statutory provisions are to be liberally construed with an eye to promoting such protection.” Industrial Welfare Com. v. Superior Court, 27 Cal.3d 690, 702 (1980). “[T]he IWC’s wage orders are entitled to ‘extraordinary deference, both in upholding their validity and in enforcing their specific terms.’” Brinker Restaurant Corp. v. Superior Court, 53 Cal.4th 1004, 1027 (2012) (quoting Martinez v. Combs, 49 Cal.4th 35, 61 (2010)). Rest break requirements “have long been viewed as part of the remedial worker protection framework.” Murphy v. Kenneth Cole Productions, Inc., 40 Cal.4th 1094, 1105 (2007).
The Class Certification Process
Under the Fair Labor Standards Act ("FLSA"), individuals may bring suit “on behalf of himself or themselves and other employees similarly situated.” 29 U.S.C. §216(b). Neither the statute itself nor the Ninth Circuit have defined the term “similarly situated,” Luque v. AT&T Corp., 2010 WL 4807088 (N.D.Cal. Nov. 19, 2010) at *3, citing Lewis v. Wells Fargo & Co., 669 F.Supp.2d 1124, 1127 (N.D.Cal. 2009). Courts in the Ninth Circuit take a two-step approach to determine whether plaintiffs are “similarly situated.” Id.The Court’s first step is to make an initial, conditional determination of whether the plaintiffs are similarly situated, “deciding whether a collective action should be certified for the purpose of sending notice to potential class members.” Luque, supra, at *3, quoting Lewis, supra, at 1127. The initial notice stage determination utilizes a lenient standard that typically results in certification. Wynn v. National Broad Co., Inc., 234 F.Supp.2d 1067, 1082 (C.D.Cal. 2002). While the initial inquiry is not a mere formality, plaintiffs seeking conditional certification need only provide “substantial allegations, supported by declarations or discovery.” Luque, supra, at *3, citing Kress v. PriceWaterhouseCoopers, LLP, 263 F.R.D. 623, 627 (E.D.Cal. 2009). Indeed, “Courts need not even consider evidence provided by defendants at this stage.” Luque, supra, at *3 (emphasis in original), quoting Kress, supra, at 628.
Class Rights of Taxi Drivers in Oakland, California
Oakland City Ordinance 5.64.040(d)(1)) unequivocally states that: “Fleet managers shall provide to drivers receipts for all fees collected from said drivers.”Oakland Municipal Code 5.64.040(C) states:Fleet management permittees are required to maintain for a period of not less than one year all records pertaining to the fleet manager's operation and management, including but not limited to all waybills completed by drivers, all dispatch logs, all vehicle inspection records, driver training records, passenger complaints, citation records, leasing records, and insurance records. Fleet managers shall make available for inspection, Monday through Friday from 9:00 a.m. to 5:00 p.m., all such records. Fleet managers shall take reasonable efforts to ensure the completeness and accuracy of all records. Any records which are determined to be inadequate, inaccurate, or any request which is not complied with may result in the suspension or revocation of the fleet management permit pursuant to Section 5.64.080.
Determining Employment Status in California
“The California Supreme Court has developed a multi-factor test for determining employment status.” Ruiz v. Affinity Logistics Corp. (9th Cir. 2011) 667 F.3d 1318, 1324, quoting S.G. Borello & Sons, Inc. v. Dept. of Indust. Rel. (1989) 48 Cal.3d 341 (“Borello”). “[U]nder California law, once a plaintiff comes forward with evidence that he provided services for an employer, the employee has established a prima facie case that the relationship was one of employer/employee.” Narayan v. EGL, Inc. (9th Cir. 2010) 616 F.3d 895, 900, citing Robinson v. George, (1940) 16 Cal.2d 238, 243-244. “Once the employee establishes a prima facie case, the burden shifts to the employer, which may prove, if it can, that the presumed employee was an independent contractor.” Id. (citation omitted).Under California law, primary test of an employment relationship is whether “the person to whom service is rendered has the right to control the manner and means of accomplishing the result desired….” Borello, supra, at 350. While the right to control work details is the most important factor, there are also “’secondary’ indicia of the nature of a service arrangement.” Id. These secondary factors, principally derived from the Rest.2d Agency, include
Discovery and Physician/Patient Confidentiality
The California Constitution and the California Evidence Code establish a right of privacy which protects communications between a physician and patient. Roe v. Sup. Ct. (1991) 229 Cal.App.3d 832, 837 (physician-patient privilege broadly construed in favor of the patient for public policy reasons). Jones v. Sup. Ct. (1981) 119 Cal.App.3d 534, 549–550, citing Board of Medical Quality Assurance v. Gherardini (1979) 93 Cal.App.3d 669, 678–679:“A person's medical profile is an area of privacy infinitely more intimate, more personal in quality and nature than many areas already judicially recognized and protected . . . . [¶] The individual's right to privacy encompasses not only the state of his mind, but also his viscera, detailed complaints of physical ills, and their emotional overtones. The state of a person's gastro-intestinal tract is as much entitled to privacy from unauthorized public or bureaucratic snooping as is that person's bank account, the contents of his library or his membership in the NAACP. We conclude the specie of privacy here sought to be invaded falls squarely within the protected ambit, the expressed objectives of article I, section 1 [of the California Constitution].”